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Most theories of decision making suggest that, when options imply tradeoffs between their attributes,
conflict increases as tradeoff size increases, because greater sacrifices are to be incurred in choosing one
option instead of another. An alternative view is that conflict decreases as tradeoff size increases, because
stronger arguments can be made for any decision. The authors propose a unified model, the double-
mediation model, which combines the mediating effects of sacrifice and argumentation. Our model
generally predicts an inverse U-shaped relation between tradeoff size and conflict. Results support this
prediction. Also, when the decision situation increases the mediating effect of sacrifice relative to that of
argumentation, the relation between tradeoff size and conflict changes in an upward direction; con-
versely, when the decision situation increases the mediating effect of argumentation relative to that of
sacrifice, the relation changes in a downward direction. Results support these predictions as well.
Commonalities and differences between our model and other formulations are discussed.
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Most theories of decision making suggest that conflict arises
when the options under consideration imply tradeoffs between
their attributes, that it increases with the size of the tradeoffs, and
that it decreases with the difference in importance between the
attributes (Chatterjee & Heath, 1996; Scholten, 2002). Regarding
tradeoff size, conflict is believed to be greater when more or larger
advantages of one option are to be traded off against more or larger
advantages of another option (Festinger, 1964). However, when
asked about this, people often express the opposite belief, that
conflict is greater when the advantages to be traded off are few and
small than when they are many or large. When asked why this
would be so, they typically answer that, when the advantages to be
traded off are few and small, any decision is tenuous, in that it is
difficult to find good reasons for choosing any option. Thus, a
common intuition, which has its appeal from a reason-based per-
spective on decision making (Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993;
Simonson, 1989), is that conflict decreases, rather than increases,
with tradeoff size.
In this article we discuss a unified model, the double-mediation
model, which suggests that conflict may both increase with
tradeoff size, because larger tradeoffs mean that greater sacrifices
are to be incurred in choosing one option instead of another, and
decrease with tradeoff size, because larger tradeoffs mean that
stronger arguments can be made for any decision. We derive
testable implications from this model, which were tested in two
experiments.
Defining Conflict
When faced with tradeoffs, people are often not sure which
decision to make and not sure whether they would make the same
decision on a different occasion (Tversky & Sattath, 1979). Al-
though conflict has no formal definition (Tversky & Shafir, 1992),
it is usually described as such a state of preference uncertainty,
which suffices as an informal definition.
Predicting Conflict
In our experiments, participants were presented with several
decision domains, mostly consumer products with which they were
familiar and with which they had affinity. On each occasion, they
were presented with a particular product, for example, cellular
phones, and with two options that differ along two continuous
attributes, for example, talk time and weight. The options implied
a tradeoff between those attributes, in that one option was better
along one attribute, for example, more talk time, but the other
option was better along the other attribute, for example, less
weight, and the participants were asked to choose. We examined
how conflict is related to the size of the tradeoff and how this
relation is moderated by other aspects of the decision situation. In
Experiment 1, we focused on an aspect that is ubiquitous in
decision making: the difference in importance between the at-
tributes under consideration.
A model of conflict generation necessarily draws on assump-
tions about preference formation. For instance, if it is assumed that
preferences are formed simply by determining which option is
better along the more important attribute, without any consider-
ation of the tradeoff between the attributes (i.e., lexicographic
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ordering; see Fishburn, 1974), then conflict should be unrelated to
tradeoff size. Our model, however, suggests that conflict is related
to tradeoff size, that this relation can take on many forms, and that
the specific shape depends on the decision situation.
Assumptions About Preference Formation
The double-mediation model derives its assumptions about pref-
erence formation from (multiattribute) decision field theory (Buse-
meyer & Diederich, 2002; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Died-
erich, 1997). It assumes that preferences are formed by a
preliminary impression of the decision problem and subsequent
deliberation about the decision problem. When a decision maker is
presented with a decision problem, a preliminary impression is
formed on the basis of prior knowledge about or past experience
with the decision domain. The preliminary impression is translated
into an initial preference state, which may be neutral or not. For
instance, if, on the basis of prior knowledge about or past experi-
ence with cellular phones, talk time is more important to the
decision maker than weight, the initial preference state will favor
the option that has a longer talk time. Generally, however, the
decision maker will not simply choose that option right there and
then but will start deliberating about which option to choose.
Deliberation is a process of considering and reconsidering at-
tributes, comparing the options along the attribute that is being
considered at a particular moment, contemplating consequences of
choosing one option instead of the other, evaluating the options on
the basis of those consequences, and updating the preference state
by the value difference between the options. For instance, when
the weight of the cellular phones is being considered, the prefer-
ence state will be adjusted in favor of the option that has less
weight, but the magnitude of the adjustment will depend on the
consequences that are being contemplated at that moment. Delib-
eration stops when the preference for one of the options is, ac-
cording to a criterion set by the decision maker, strong enough.
That option is then chosen.
The above process of preference formation (or, rather, prefer-
ence evolution) is formally described by decision field theory. This
stochastic–dynamic theory of decision making predicts the prob-
ability that a particular decision will be made and the average time
it will take to make that decision. If decision time is viewed as a
manifestation of conflict, as it has been in applications of conflict
theory (Berlyne, 1957a; but see Berlyne, 1962, 1966) and decision
field theory (Diederich, 2003), then decision field theory can be
viewed as a theory of decision making and a theory of the conflict
involved in decision making. However, it has thus far not been
applied to the question how conflict is related to the size of the
tradeoff between the attributes under consideration and how this
relation is moderated by other aspects of the decision situation, for
example, the difference in importance between the attributes.
Moreover, the double-mediation model, in addressing this ques-
tion, identifies two sources of conflict in preference formation,
namely, concern about the sacrifices that are to be incurred in
choosing one option instead of the other as well as concern about
the arguments that can be made in favor of either decision: It is not
obvious how these sources of conflict are to be defined within the
formal machinery of decision field theory. Therefore, we develop
the double-mediation model as an autonomous model of conflict
generation, drawing on the assumptions about preference forma-
tion from decision field theory.
The double-mediation model invokes two sets of assumptions
about conflict generation: (a) those motivated by the process of
preference formation and (b) those motivated by the operation of
two sources of conflict in that process. To show more clearly the
implications of each set of assumptions and to smooth the transi-
tion from the state of the art to the double-mediation model, we
first discuss a single-mediation model, which suggests that concern
about sacrifice is the only source of conflict in the process of
preference formation. This sets the stage for the development of
the double-mediation model, which suggests that concern about
sacrifice and concern about argumentation are both sources of
conflict in that process.
Assumptions of the Single-Mediation Model
As mentioned earlier, most theories of decision making suggest
that conflict increases with tradeoff size. One rationale for a
positive relation between tradeoff size and conflict is provided by
the theory of cognitive dissonance. According to Festinger (1964),
conflict before a decision has the same origin as cognitive disso-
nance after the decision: the things that the decision maker knows
are inconsistent with a particular decision. The greater the number
of inconsistencies, the greater the conflict and subsequent cogni-
tive dissonance. For instance, the choice between cellular phones
X  (longer talk time, larger memory store) and Y  (longer
standby time, less weight), where each option has two advantages
and two disadvantages, should arouse more conflict than the
choice between x  (longer talk time) and y  (less weight),
where each option has only one advantage and one disadvantage.
What applies to the number of inconsistencies also applies to the
magnitude of the inconsistencies (see Shugan, 1980). For instance,
the choice between xL  (5 hr, 160g) and y  (2 hr, 70g), where
the options differ by 3 hr in talk time and 90g in weight, should
arouse more conflict than the choice between xS  (21⁄2 hr, 85g)
and y  (2 hr, 70g), where the options differ by only 1⁄2 hr in talk
time and 15g in weight.
Another rationale for a positive relation between tradeoff size
and conflict is provided by prospect theory. According to Kahne-
man and Tversky (1979), losses are more painful than equivalent
gains are pleasant and, according to Simonson and Tversky (1992;
Tversky & Simonson, 1993), this also applies to relative gains and
losses: Disadvantages are more painful than equivalent advantages
are pleasant. Thus, larger tradeoffs lead to a greater unattractive-
ness of both options under consideration, which amplifies the
lose–lose nature of the decision and intensifies the vacillation
between the options (Chatterjee & Heath, 1996). In general, larger
tradeoffs mean that greater sacrifices are to be incurred in choosing
one option instead of the other, leading to a greater conflict. This
proposal is incorporated into the single-mediation model, which is
developed below in three steps.
Updating conflict. The single-mediation model identifies con-
cern about sacrifice as the only source of conflict in preference
formation. Conflict is elicited from this source by a preliminary
impression of the decision problem and by subsequent deliberation
about the decision problem. The conflict from the preliminary
impression is updated by the conflict from deliberation into final
conflict. Obviously, the more the conflict from the preliminary
impression is updated by the conflict from deliberation, the less the
former contributes to final conflict.
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Relation with tradeoff size. Preference formation is described
as a process in which a preliminary impression is formed on the
basis of prior knowledge about or past experience with the deci-
sion domain and in which, during subsequent deliberation, the
options are compared along their attributes and the consequences
of choosing one option instead of the other are contemplated.
Thus, it is only during deliberation that the tradeoff between the
attributes is considered and that conflict is affected by the size of
the tradeoff. According to the single-mediation model, conflict is
positively affected by tradeoff size, because larger tradeoffs mean
greater sacrifices, leading to a greater conflict.
Drive for deliberation. As preference formation is described,
choice is generally not dictated by the preliminary impression but
by subsequent deliberation. The question arises, Why would peo-
ple even bother deliberating? An obvious answer, in the spirit of
decision field theory, is that they are not oriented toward a choice
that is trouble-free but rather toward a choice that is good enough.
However, this answer begs the question, What is the origin of that
orientation?
Although conflict is generally believed to have a paralyzing
effect on an individual by producing vacillation between alterna-
tive courses of action, Berlyne (1961) has shown that it also has a
mobilizing effect on the individual by producing a drive to gather
information about the alternative courses of action and to get ready
for action, that is, an orientation reaction: The greater the conflict,
the greater the drive (see also the evidence reviewed by Berlyne,
1957b, and the evidence reported by Bettman, Johnson, Luce, &
Payne, 1993). Thus, preference formation can be viewed as a
process in which conflict first has a mobilizing effect (getting
ready) and only then a paralyzing effect (getting stuck). If you
don’t get ready, you won’t get stuck. Consistent with this proposal,
the single-mediation model suggests that the conflict from the
preliminary impression is the drive for deliberation: The greater
the conflict, the greater the drive.
In sum, the single-mediation model assumes that the conflict
from the preliminary impression is the drive for deliberation, that
the conflict from deliberation increases with tradeoff size, and that
the conflict from the preliminary impression is updated by the
conflict from deliberation into final conflict. A formal statement of
these assumptions follows below.
Formulation of the Single-Mediation Model
Applying Anderson’s (1971) integration theory, the updating of
conflict can be captured by a weighted averaging model:
C  1  wSS0  wS S1, (1)
where S0, S1  0 and 0  wS  1. In this formulation, wS is
an updating parameter, which covers everything from no updating
at all, when wS  0, to complete updating, as wS3 1. In addition,
S0 is the conflict from the preliminary impression, 1  wSS0 is
the residual conflict from the preliminary impression after the
updating, wS S1 is the conflict from deliberation, and C is final
conflict. A weighted averaging model is equivalent to an
anchoring-and-adjustment model:
C  S0  wS(S1  S0),
which describes an anchoring on the conflict from the preliminary
impression, S0, and an adjustment by the conflict from delibera-
tion, wS(S1  S0). Given this formulation, the single-mediation
model invokes two additional assumptions, one about S1 and the
other about wS. First, to capture the positive relation between
tradeoff size and conflict, S1 is defined as a function of tradeoff
size, T, which itself is a function of the perceived difference
between the two options along each of the two continuous at-
tributes (see our experiments):
S1  fS(T), (2)
where T 0 and fS is an increasing function. For simplicity, we
assume in this article that fS is a linear function. Second, to capture
the capacity of the preliminary conflict as a drive for deliberation,
wS is defined as a function of S0 which itself is a function of other
aspects of the decision situation, for example, differential attribute
importance (see below):
wS  g(S0), (3)
where g is an increasing function. In terms of Anderson’s (1971)
integration theory, Equation 3 changes Equation 1 into a differen-
tially weighted averaging model, in that the relative weight of the
preliminary conflict, 1  wS, is inversely related to its level, S0:
The conflict from the preliminary impression curtails its own
contribution to final conflict by raising the drive for deliberation.
Below, we discuss the implications of the single-mediation model
for the relation between tradeoff size and conflict.
Implications of the Single-Mediation Model
The single-mediation model predicts that conflict will generally
have a positive relation with tradeoff size but that this relation will
be moderated by other aspects of the decision situation, for exam-
ple, differential attribute importance. Imagine a person who, on the
basis of prior knowledge about or past experience with cellular
phones, believes that talk time is about as important as weight, a
second person who believes that talk time is more important than
weight, and a third person who believes that talk time is much
more important than weight.1 The single-mediation model predicts
that differential attribute importance will decrease the conflict
from the preliminary impression (see the decreasing flat lines
denoted S0 in Figure 1A), because incurring a sacrifice along the
less important attribute seems less painful than incurring a sacri-
fice along the more important attribute. Moreover, the single-
mediation model predicts that a decreasing conflict from the pre-
liminary impression will attenuate the relation between tradeoff
size and final conflict (see the flattening lines denoted C), because
it decreases the drive for deliberation.
We emphasize that the moderating effect of situational aspects
(in the above example, the attenuating effect of differential at-
tribute importance) follows only from the differentially weighted
averaging model, in which the updating parameter, wS, varies with
the preliminary conflict, S0, and that it does not follow from a
weighted averaging model in which wS is a constant. If situational
aspects affected only S0, the lines describing the relation between
tradeoff size and final conflict, C, would decrease with decreasing
S0 but would run strictly parallel to one another. However, it is
1 These labels should not be held to imply that there are “substantive”
criteria to distinguish between “categories” of differential attribute
importance.
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because situational aspects affect S0 and because wS varies directly
with S0 that those lines gravitate toward S0 with decreasing S0.
Ultimately, when S0, the conflict from the preliminary impression,
decreases beyond a level that it is no longer a drive for delibera-
tion, choice will be dictated by the preliminary impression, and the
relation between tradeoff size and final conflict will vanish.
As mentioned earlier, conflict is generally believed to decrease
with differential attribute importance. According to the single-
mediation model, this holds for the conflict from the preliminary
impression, but not necessarily for final conflict. Specifically, a
corollary of the above predictions, which can be seen most clearly
in Figure 1B, is that final conflict may increase, rather than
decrease, with differential attribute importance. This occurs when
lower levels of conflict elicited by deliberation about smaller
tradeoffs are losing weight relative to a decreasing but still a higher
level of conflict elicited by the preliminary impression.
The single-mediation model suggests that the relation between
tradeoff size and conflict is mediated only by sacrifice. Below, we
develop a model of conflict generation, according to which this
relation is mediated also by argumentation.
Assumptions of the Double-Mediation Model
The intuition that conflict decreases rather than increases with
tradeoff size focuses on how a decision can be justified to oneself
rather than what one foregoes with the decision. Festinger (1964)
drew a sharp distinction between conflict before a decision, when
people are supposedly impartial between the options under con-
sideration, and cognitive dissonance after the decision, when peo-
ple, motivated to justify the decision to themselves, are biased in
favor of the option selected and against the option rejected, thus
spreading the options apart in attractiveness. It has long been
suggested, however, that self-justification also occurs before a
decision, so as to make the decision possible (Janis, 1959; Shepard,
1964). More recently, the idea that people argue themselves to-
ward a decision has reappeared under the rubric of reason-based
choice (Shafir et al., 1993; Simonson, 1989). The paradigm of
reason-based choice provides a rationale for a negative relation
between tradeoff size and conflict. For instance, the choice be-
tween cellular phones xL  (5 hr, 160g) and y  (2 hr, 70g), which
makes a difference of 3 hr in talk time and 90g in weight, offers a
better reason for choosing either option than the choice between
Figure 1. The single-mediation model. (A) The predicted relation between tradeoff size and conflict, as
moderated by differential attribute importance. (B) Summary of the relations between tradeoff size and final
conflict.
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xS  (21⁄2 hr, 85g) and y  (2 hr, 70g), which makes a difference
of only 1⁄2 hr in talk time and 15g in weight, so that the choice
between xL and y should arouse less conflict than the choice
between xS and y. In general, larger tradeoffs mean that stronger
arguments can be made in favor of either decision, leading to less
conflict. This proposal is incorporated into the double-mediation
model, which is developed below in four steps.
Parallel updating of conflict. The double-mediation model
identifies two sources of conflict in preference formation: (a)
concern about sacrifice and (b) concern about argumentation.
Conflict is elicited from each source by a preliminary impression
of the decision problem and by subsequent deliberation about the
decision problem. The conflict elicited from one source is updated
in parallel with the conflict elicited from the other source.
Reverse relations with tradeoff size. The conflict elicited from
the two sources by deliberation is related in opposite directions to
tradeoff size. The conflict generated by concern about sacrifice is
positively related to tradeoff size, because larger tradeoffs mean
greater sacrifices, leading to a greater conflict, whereas the conflict
generated by concern about argumentation is negatively related to
tradeoff size, because larger tradeoffs mean stronger arguments,
leading to less conflict.
Drives for focused deliberation. The conflict elicited from
either source by the preliminary impression is, according to the
double-mediation model, a drive for focused deliberation: The
preliminary conflict generated by concern about sacrifice or con-
cern about argumentation is the drive for addressing that concern
during subsequent deliberation.
Aversion to conflict. Although people may generally not be
oriented toward a choice that is trouble-free, this does not mean
that they enjoy figuring out which choice is good enough. Conflict
is actually believed to be an unpleasant state from which people
wish to escape (Shepard, 1964), and support for this belief comes
from research in which participants may either choose one of the
options under consideration or choose none (the no-choice option).
Evidence shows that the probability of choosing the no-choice
option is greater in the presence than in the absence of a tradeoff
(Dhar, 1997; Dhar & Nowlis, 1999; Tversky & Shafir, 1992) and
that this probability increases with (other) manifestations of con-
flict, for example, decision time (Luce, 1998) and the number of
thoughts for and against each option (Dhar, 1997). Thus, people do
tend to escape from conflict, if there is a chance to do so.2 The
double-mediation model suggests, however, that, even if there is
no chance to escape, people still tend to cope with conflict along
the route of least resistance. This pattern, of which escape is the
most drastic manifestation, is referred to as conflict aversion.
The double-mediation model identifies two sources of conflict
from which, in most cases, unequal levels of conflict will be
elicited. The question arises, Will these levels of conflict contrib-
ute equally to final conflict or not? In view of conflict aversion, the
answer is that they will not: The lower level of conflict, whatever
its source, will contribute more to final conflict.
To illustrate, imagine that, when faced with a small tradeoff,
little conflict is generated by concern about sacrifice but a lot of
conflict is generated by concern about argumentation, and that,
when faced with a large tradeoff, a lot of conflict is generated by
concern about sacrifice but little conflict is generated by concern
about argumentation. Conflict aversion means that, in the former
case, the small magnitude of the sacrifices receives more attention
than the weakness of the arguments (the decision tends to be
treated as “trivial” rather than “very hard to justify”), whereas, in
the latter case, the strength of the arguments receives more atten-
tion than the large magnitude of the sacrifices (the decision tends
to be treated as “very easy to justify” rather than “highly conse-
quential”). Alternatively, imagine that, when faced with some
intermediate tradeoff, concern about sacrifice generates as much
conflict as concern about argumentation. In this case, one source
receives as much attention as the other (there is no route of least
resistance). Thus, according to the double-mediation model, con-
flict aversion manifests itself as defensive inattention (Wood,
2000) to the source from which most conflict is elicited.
In sum, the double-mediation model assumes that the conflict
elicited from either source by the preliminary impression is a drive
for focused deliberation; that the conflict elicited from the two
sources by deliberation is related in opposite directions to tradeoff
size; that the conflict elicited from one source is updated in parallel
with the conflict elicited from the other source; and that the lower
level of conflict, whatever its source, contributes more to final
conflict. A formal statement of these assumptions follows below.
Formulation of the Double-Mediation Model
The parallel updating of conflict can be captured by a pair of
updating rules, one for the conflict generated by concern about
sacrifice, S, and the other for the conflict generated by concern
about argumentation, A:
S  1  wS)S0  wS S1,
A  1  wA)A0  wAA1,
where A0, A1  0 and 0  wA  1. Given this formulation, the
double-mediation model invokes additional assumptions about
how S1 and A1 are related to tradeoff size, how wS and wA are
related to the conflict from the preliminary impression, and how S
and A are integrated into final conflict. First, to capture the reverse
relations between tradeoff size and conflict, S1 and A1 are defined
as functions of tradeoff size:
S1  fST,
A1  fA(T),
where fS is an increasing function and fA is a decreasing function.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the double-mediation
model assumes no fundamental asymmetry between the mediating
effects of sacrifice and argumentation, so that, whatever the size of
the tradeoff, fS increases as much as fA decreases. For simplicity,
we assume in this article that fS and fA are linear functions. Second,
to capture the capacity of the preliminary conflict levels as drives




where g is the same increasing function in both equations. Third,
given conflict aversion, the relative contribution of S and A to final
2 The whole trajectory, then, is one of getting ready (orientation reac-
tion), getting stuck (vacillation), and getting out (escape).
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conflict is a function of their relative levels, in that the lower level
contributes more. This can be captured by a differentially weighted
averaging model:
C  1  w)S wA, (4)
where 0  w  1, 1  w is the relative weight of S, w is the
relative weight of A, and w is defined as a function of S and A:
w  h(S, A), (5)
where h is a function with three properties: It is increasing in S, it
is decreasing in A, and h(CS, CA)  1⁄2 if and only if S  A. If the
latter holds, then w  1  w  1⁄2, so that S and A contribute
equally to C. However, if S A, then w 1⁄2, so that A contributes
more to C, but if S  A, then 1  w  1⁄2, so that S contributes
more to C. Thus, Equation 5 changes Equation 4 into a differen-
tially weighted averaging model, in that the relative weight of the
conflict from a source is inversely related to its level: The conflict
from a particular source curtails its own contribution to final
conflict by raising defensive inattention to that source.
In the appendix, we provide a fully parametric formulation of
the double-mediation model by specifying the functions fS, fA, g,
and h, and we estimate its parameters from our experimental
results. (We also perform parametric tests of our hypotheses.) That
formulation and those parameters are the blueprint for all the
figures illustrating the implications of the double-mediation model
for the relation between tradeoff size and conflict. However,
nothing in the appendix is indispensable for understanding those
implications.
Implications of the Double-Mediation Model
The double-mediation model predicts that conflict will generally
have an inverse U-shaped relation with tradeoff size but that this
relation will be moderated by other aspects of the decision situa-
tion. In Experiment 1, we concentrate on differential attribute
importance, as mentioned earlier.
The left panel of Figure 2A shows a situation in which one attribute
is about as important as the other. In the range of small to intermediate
tradeoffs, concern about sacrifice generates less conflict than concern
about argumentation, whereas, in the range of intermediate to large
tradeoffs, concern about argumentation generates less conflict than
concern about sacrifice. In view of conflict aversion, lower levels of
Figure 2. The double-mediation model. (A) The predicted relation between tradeoff size and conflict, as
moderated by differential attribute importance. (B) Summary of the relations between tradeoff size and final
conflict.
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conflict, whatever their source, contribute more to final conflict.
Therefore, in the range of smaller tradeoffs, the conflict generated by
concern about sacrifice, which has a positive relation with tradeoff
size, contributes more to final conflict whereas, in the range of larger
tradeoffs, the conflict generated by concern about argumentation,
which has a negative relation with tradeoff size, contributes more to
final conflict. Overall, then, final conflict has an inverse U-shaped
relation with tradeoff size.
We emphasize that the inverse U-shaped relation follows
only from the differentially weighted averaging model, in which
the relative contribution of the conflict from the two sources to
final conflict is a function of their relative levels, and that it
does not follow from a weighted averaging model in which their
relative contribution is constant. To illustrate, in the left panel
of Figure 2A, the reverse relations between tradeoff size and the
conflict from the two sources form a (nearly) symmetrical X
pattern. In the absence of conflict aversion, and in the absence
of any good reason why the conflict from one source would
contribute more to final conflict than the conflict from the other
source, the relation between tradeoff size and final conflict
would be a (nearly) flat line.
What are the implications of a greater difference in importance
between the attributes? First, the double-mediation model predicts
that differential attribute importance will lead to a decrease in the
preliminary conflict generated by concern about sacrifice, because
incurring a sacrifice along the less important attribute seems less
painful than incurring a sacrifice along the more important at-
tribute. Second, the double-mediation model predicts that differ-
ential attribute importance will lead to an even greater decrease in
the preliminary conflict generated by concern about argumenta-
tion, because it offers the decision maker a strong argument for a
particular decision (Shafir et al., 1993; Slovic, 1975; Tversky,
Sattath, & Slovic, 1988), but it offers no relief from the sacrifice
to be incurred in making that decision (less painful as that sacrifice
may seem than the sacrifice to be incurred in making the opposite
decision). Third, the double-mediation model predicts that a fall in
preliminary conflict generated by concern about sacrifice or con-
cern about argumentation will attenuate the relation between
tradeoff size and the conflict generated by that concern, because it
decreases the associated drive for focused deliberation.
The center panel of Figure 2A shows a situation in which one
attribute is more important than the other. The relation between
tradeoff size and the conflict generated by each concern has been
attenuated, but the negative relation between tradeoff size and the
conflict generated by concern about argumentation has been atten-
uated to a greater degree than the positive relation between
tradeoff size and the conflict generated by concern about sacrifice.
As a result, the relation between tradeoff size and final conflict has
changed in an upward direction.3 More specifically, the inverse
U-shaped relation has changed into a positive relation.
Finally, what are the implications of a still greater difference in
importance between the attributes? According to the double-
mediation model, the conflict from the preliminary impression will
decrease even further and, with it, the drives for focused deliber-
ation, so that the relation between tradeoff size and conflict will be
attenuated even further. The right panel of Figure 2A shows a
situation in which one attribute is much more important than the
other. As can be seen, the relation between tradeoff size and final
conflict has changed in a downward direction. More specifically,
the positive relation has changed into a nearly zero relation.
In sum, we arrive at the following hypotheses about how con-
flict is related to the size of the tradeoff between the attributes
under consideration and how this relation is moderated by the
difference in importance between the attributes:
H1.1. When one attribute is about as important as the other
(equal attribute importance), there will be an inverse U-shaped
relation between tradeoff size and conflict;
H1.2. When one attribute is more important than the other
(unequal attribute importance), the relation between tradeoff size
and conflict will change in an upward direction, more specifically,
the inverse U-shaped relation will change into a (more) positive
relation;
H1.3. When one attribute is much more important than the other
(very unequal attribute importance), the relation between tradeoff size
and conflict will change in a downward direction, more specifically,
the positive relation will change into a (nearly) zero relation.
Conflict is generally believed to decrease with differential at-
tribute importance (for support, see Chatterjee & Heath, 1996;
Scholten, 2002; Simonson, 1989). According to the double-
mediation model, this holds for the conflict from the preliminary
impression but not necessarily for final conflict. As can be seen in
Figure 2B, the final conflict aroused by large tradeoffs is, in this
example, greater in the situation of unequal attribute importance
than in the situation of equal attribute importance (the cross-over
point is marked by a circle), although final conflict is generally
lower in the former situation than in the latter.
Measuring Conflict
There is no generally accepted procedure for measuring conflict
(Tversky & Shafir, 1992). Actually, the literature suggests a large
variety of mental and behavioral manifestations of conflict. In our
experiments, we derive a composite measure of conflict, denoted Cˆ
from the following five component measures, all of which are
positively related to conflict4:
1. The time to reach a decision (Berlyne, 1957a; Diederich,
2003; Festinger, 1943a, 1943b; Fischer, Jia, & Luce, 2000a; Fi-
scher, Luce, & Jia, 2000b; Kiesler, 1966; Luce, 1998; Luce,
Bettman, & Payne, 1997; Tyebjee, 1979), denoted t;
2. The degree to which the options are equally preferred (Tye-
bjee, 1979), denoted E(v);
3 Statements that a relation changes in an upward or a downward
direction concern changes in the linear trend of the relation and cover a
great diversity of situations. For instance, when an inverse U-shaped
relation changes into a positive relation, the linear trend changes from
(nearly) zero to greater than zero. Alternatively, when a negative relation
changes into an inverse U-shaped relation, the linear trend changes from
smaller than zero to (nearly) zero. The statement that the relation changes
in an upward direction applies to both situations.
4 Other measures of conflict used in the literature, but not included in our
composite measure of conflict, are the number of thoughts for and against
each option under consideration (Dhar, 1997; Simonson, 1989), choice of
the no-choice option (Dhar, 1996, 1997; Dhar & Nowlis, 1999; Dhar &
Simonson, 2003; Luce, 1998; Tversky & Shafir, 1992), anticipated regret
about the decision reached (Chatterjee & Heath, 1996), and inconsistency
between decisions reached on separate occasions (Fischer et al., 2000a,
2000b; Luce, Jia, & Fischer, 2003).
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3. The degree to which the attributes are equally important for
the decision (being) reached (Simonson, 1989), denoted E(w)5;
4. The difficulty of reaching a decision (Chatterjee & Heath,
1996; Scholten, 2002; Simonson, 1989), denoted d; and
5. The lack of confidence in the (correctness of the) decision
reached (Dhar, 1996; Festinger, 1943a, 1943b; Russo, Meloy, &
Medvec, 1998; Zakay, 1985; Zakay & Tsal, 1993), denoted u.
There are at least three differences between decision time and the
other conflict measures as we obtain them. Decision time is a behav-
ioral manifestation of conflict, recorded unobtrusively by the experi-
menter as a decision is being reached (“online”). The other conflict
measures are mental manifestations of conflict, rated by the partici-
pants (along standard rating scales) after a decision has been reached
(“off-line”).6 The methodological differences between decision time
and the rating measures of conflict are useful for assessing the con-
struct validity of composite conflict measure Cˆ .
Experiment 1
Method
Design and stimuli. Each participant completed 12 decision tasks, four
tasks in which, according to pretest results, one attribute was about as
important as the other (equal attribute importance), four tasks in which one
attribute was more important than the other (unequal attribute importance),
and four tasks in which one attribute was much more important than the
other (very unequal attribute importance). The more important attribute is
denoted attribute 1 and the less important attribute is denoted attribute 2.7
In addition to differential attribute importance, tradeoff size was manip-
ulated across the 12 decision tasks. Each participant completed four tasks
in which, also according to pretest results, the difference between the
options along each attribute was perceived to be small and insignificant
(small tradeoff), four tasks in which the difference between the options
along each attribute was perceived to be large and significant (large
tradeoff), and four tasks in which the perceived difference between the
options along each attribute fell between these two extremes (intermediate
tradeoff). So that any particular decision task would not always be asso-
ciated with any particular tradeoff size, the association of tradeoff sizes
with decision tasks was counterbalanced across three groups of partici-
pants. For one group, a particular task would be associated with a small
tradeoff; for another group, this same task would be associated with an
intermediate tradeoff; and for the remaining group, it would be associated
with a large tradeoff.
Independently of tradeoff size, the option with respect to which tradeoffs
were small, intermediate, or large was manipulated between participants, in
that tradeoff size varied with respect to the option that was superior along
attribute 1, denoted option x, for one half of the participants and with
respect to the option that was superior along attribute 2, denoted option y,
for the other half (see Figure 3).8 This control variable had no reliable
effects on conflict and will not be discussed further.
As shown in Figure 3, the options composing the dyadic choice sets were
located along a straight line in attribute space (up to slight deviations from
that line where attribute amounts were rounded), so that the rate of
exchange between the attributes was (practically) constant across tradeoffs
of different size. Table 1 provides a sample of the stimulus material used
in Experiment 1.
Participants and procedure. A total of 100 psychology students par-
ticipated in the experiment and were paid €7.50. Experimental sessions
were run by computer with at most 10 participants at a time. The partici-
pants were informed that they would complete 12 decision tasks, each
accompanied by 4 rating tasks. They were given a description of these tasks
as well as instructions and rehearsal trials for keyboard handling. Before
the session began, they were asked to provide thoughtful and truthful
responses, relying on their personal tastes and judgments.
The order of the 12 decision tasks was randomized across participants.
Each task was displayed in an attribute (row) by option (column) format
(see Figure 4). The left–right position of options x and y as well as the
top-down position of attributes 1 and 2 were randomized across partici-
pants and decision tasks. The options were labeled P and Q from left to
right, except when the task was selecting a laser or inkjet printer (see also
Table 1) or selecting a car on natural gas or gasoline, in which cases the
options were labeled as such. Before an option was selected, a leftward
arrow was located below the left option and a rightward arrow was located
below the right option, as shown in the top panel of Figure 4. The
participant selected an option by pressing the leftward or rightward arrow
on the keyboard. After that, the arrow below the nonselected option
disappeared, the arrow below the selected option remained (now blinking),
and on the bottom of the screen appeared a reminder that the participant
should press “Backspace” to correct the decision or “Enter” to confirm it,
as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 4. Depending on the participant’s
response, the program either returned to the original display of the decision
task or proceeded to the first rating task. Decision time was counted in
milliseconds from the moment that the decision task appeared on the screen
until the moment that the participant confirmed the decision.
Each decision task was accompanied by four rating tasks. The partici-
pants rated the preference between the options, the importance of the
attributes for the decision reached, the difficulty of reaching a decision, and
the (lack of) confidence in the correctness of the decision reached. The
order of the rating tasks was randomized across participants and decision
tasks.
Figure 5 shows how a rating task was displayed. The attribute-by-option
information as well as the decision reached on the basis of that information
were presented on the top of the screen. A 9-point rating scale was
presented on the bottom. Before a rating was given, numbers were located
above the 9 positions of the scale, as shown in the top panel of Figure 5.
The participant selected a position by pressing one of the corresponding
digits on the keyboard. After that, the numbers above the nonselected
positions disappeared, the number above the selected position remained
(now blinking), and on the bottom of the screen appeared a reminder that
the participant should press “Backspace” to correct the rating or “Enter” to
confirm it, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 5. Depending on the
participant’s response, the program either returned to the original display of
the rating task or proceeded to the following one. We also recorded rating
times, counted in milliseconds from the moment that a rating task appeared
on the screen until the moment that the participant confirmed a rating.
5 In the measurement context, w refers to the relative weight of the
attributes, not, as in Equation 4, to the relative weight of the conflict
generated by concern about sacrifice and the conflict generated by concern
about argumentation in determining final conflict. The meaning of w
should be clear from the context.
6 The degree to which the attributes are equally important for the
decision reached, conflict measure Ew, is conceptually distinct from the
degree to which one attribute is more important than the other before any
decision is being reached, the moderator variable of Experiment 1, in that
the former derives from a local appraisal of attribute importance, which
may be affected by the differences between the options along the attributes,
whereas the latter involves a global appraisal of attribute importance,
which is unaffected by the set of options under consideration (a distinction
introduced by Goldstein, 1990).
7 Naturally, the designation of “equal” attribute importance is an ap-
proximation: No pair of attributes is exactly equal in importance. This is
appropriately expressed by the alternative designation that one attribute is
“about” as important as the other.
8 Chatterjee and Heath (1996) manipulated tradeoff size by varying the
deviation of the options from their midpoint along the attributes. We do not
use this manipulation, because it confounds the size of the tradeoff between
the attributes with the extremeness of the options along those attributes.
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The preference rating scale was presented as in Figure 5. The other
rating scales were presented in a similar fashion. Along the importance
rating scale, positions 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 were labeled much more important,
more important, equally important, more important, and much more im-
portant, respectively. The left–right position of the attributes above this
scale corresponded to their top–bottom position elsewhere. Along the
difficulty rating scale, positions 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 were labeled very easy,
easy, neither easy nor difficult, difficult, and very difficult, respectively.
Along the confidence rating scale, positions 1 and 9 were labeled no
confidence and full confidence, respectively.
Measures. All response times (decision and rating times) were con-
verted from milliseconds to seconds. Characteristically, the response times
had positively skewed distributions, so that their means would be unduly
affected by relatively few, very slow responses. A logarithmic transforma-
tion of the response times largely removed the positive skew from all
distributions. Thus, conflict measure t, the time to reach a decision, became
log2(t), the logarithm of decision time. Similarly, rating times were trans-
formed to log2(tv), log2(tw), log2(td) and log2(tu) for preference, impor-
tance, difficulty, and confidence, respectively.
The preference ratings, v, and importance ratings, w, were coded from
1/10 to 9/10. Conflict measures E(v), the degree to which the options were
equally preferred, and E(w), the degree to which the attributes were equally
important for the decision reached, were obtained by applying an entropy
measure to v and w: E(v)  [vlog2(v)  (1  v)log2(1  v)] and
E(w)  [wlog2(w)  (1  w)log2(1  w)], where 0  v, w  1. To
illustrate, when the options are equally preferred, that is, v  1⁄2, conflict
is at its highest level, i.e., E(v)  1. As the preference for one option over
the other increases, that is, v3 0 or v3 1, conflict decreases toward its
lowest level, that is, E(v) 3 0, and at an accelerating rate. An entropy
measure of conflict was explored by Berlyne (1957b) and applied to
preference ratings by Tyebjee (1979).
The difficulty ratings were coded from 1 (very easy) to 9 (very difficult),
thus yielding conflict measure d, the difficulty of reaching a decision.
Similarly, the confidence ratings were coded from 1 (full confidence) to 9
(no confidence), thus yielding conflict measure u, the lack of confidence in
the correctness of the decision reached.
Results
Differential attribute importance: Manipulation check. A
check on the manipulation of differential attribute importance was
conducted by comparing the probability of choosing option x (the
option that was superior along the more important attribute) be-
tween the three conditions of differential attribute importance. This
probability was significantly lower when one attribute was about
as important as the other (.59) than when one attribute was more
important than the other (.77), z  5.36, p  .00 and, in turn,
significantly lower when one attribute was more important than the
other (.77) than when one attribute was much more important than
the other (.82), z  1.92, p  .03.9 Thus, differential attribute
importance was manipulated as intended.
Test of hypotheses: Dependent variable. Table 2 provides the
means, standard deviations, and correlations for all measures taken
in Experiment 1. We conducted a principal component analysis on
the five conflict measures across the 100 participants and the 12
decision tasks. The first component had an eigenvalue of  2.85,
thus accounting for 57.07% of the total variance. No other eigen-
values exceeded the unit threshold. The reliability of the un-
weighted composite of standardized conflict measures was  
.81. To improve reliability, we constructed a weighted composite
measure of conflict, Cˆ , by deriving the (standardized) scores on the
first component (see Lindeman, Merenda, & Gold, 1980, pp.
281–283) and then linearly transforming these scores to a scale
from 0 to 1.
9 Newman–Keuls tests revealed that there were no significant differ-
ences in the probability of choosing option x among the decision tasks
representing the same level of differential attribute importance.
Figure 3. The manipulation of tradeoff size. In the left panel, ys, yI, and yL, are options that imply a small,
intermediate, and large tradeoff, respectively, with option x. Similarly, in the right panel, xs, xI, and xL are
options that imply a small, intermediate, and large tradeoff, respectively, with option y. The large tradeoff in the
left panel is the same as the one in the right panel. The attributes are scaled from worse to better.
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Test of hypotheses: Independent variables. The hypotheses
were tested with linear regression analyses, run across participants
and decision tasks. Pooling across k decision tasks is common
practice in related research where the dependent variable is dyadic
choice (rather than the conflict aroused by the choice). Usually, the
pooled regression analyses conducted in that research either in-
clude k – 1 interactions between an independent variable and the k
decision tasks so as to check whether the effect of the variable is
robust across the tasks (Dhar, 1997; Dhar & Nowlis, 2004; Dhar &
Sherman, 1996; Dhar & Simonson, 2003) or include 2k – 1
alternative-specific dummies so as to capture the overall probabil-
ity with which each option is chosen (Dhar & Nowlis, 1999;
Nowlis, 1995; Nowlis & Simonson, 1996). We adapted both
approaches to our regression analyses.
We conducted 4 regression analyses, one across the 12 decision
tasks, representing 3 levels of differential attribute importance and
4 replications of each level, and 3 analyses across the 4 replications
within each level of differential attribute importance. The regres-
sion analysis across the 12 decision tasks addressed the 3 hypoth-
eses combined (H1.1–H1.3), evaluating the changing shape of the
relation between tradeoff size and conflict with changes in differ-
ential attribute importance. The analysis included 2 orthogonal
polynomial contrasts (linear and quadratic) between the 3 levels of
differential attribute importance, 9 orthogonal difference contrasts
(or “inverse Helmert” contrasts) between the 4 replications of the
respective levels of differential attribute importance (capturing the
overall differences in conflict between replications), 2 orthogonal
polynomial contrasts (linear and quadratic) between the 3 levels of
tradeoff size, 1 contrast between the 2 levels of the control variable
(the option with respect to which tradeoff size was varied), and 12
orthogonal contrasts capturing the interactions between the inde-
pendent variables (differential attribute importance, tradeoff size,
and the control variable).
The 3 analyses across the 4 replications within each level of
differential attribute importance addressed the 3 hypotheses indi-
vidually, evaluating the specific shapes of the relation between
tradeoff size and conflict as well as their robustness across deci-
sion tasks. Each analysis included 3 orthogonal difference con-
trasts between the 4 replications of the particular level of differ-
ential attribute importance (capturing the overall differences in
conflict between replications), 2 orthogonal polynomial contrasts
(linear and quadratic) between the 3 levels of tradeoff size, 1
contrast between the 2 levels of the control variable (the option
with respect to which tradeoff size was varied), and 2 orthogonal
contrasts capturing the interaction between the independent vari-
ables (tradeoff size and the control variable). To check whether the
linear or quadratic trend in the relation between tradeoff size and
conflict was robust across decision tasks, we evaluated whether
inclusion of 3 orthogonal contrasts capturing the interaction be-
tween trend and decision task yielded a reliable and meaningful
increase in goodness-of-fit (R2) of the regression model.
Tests of hypotheses: Results. Figure 6 shows how the relation
between tradeoff size and conflict is moderated by differential
attribute importance. Two regression results confirmed the chang-
ing shape of the relation between tradeoff size and conflict with
changes in differential attribute importance. First, the linear con-
trast between the levels of tradeoff size interacted significantly
with the quadratic contrast between the levels of differential at-
tribute importance, t(1173)  2.58, p  .01: Consistent with
H1.1–H1.3, the relation between tradeoff size and conflict was
more positive when one attribute was more important than the
other than when one attribute was about as important as the other
or when one attribute was much more important than the other.
Second, the quadratic contrast between the levels of tradeoff size
interacted significantly with the linear contrast between the levels
of differential attribute importance, t(1173)  3.00, p  .00:
Consistent with H1.1, there was an inverse U-shaped relation
between tradeoff size and conflict when one attribute was about as
important as the other but, inconsistent with H1.3, there was a
U-shaped relation between tradeoff size and conflict rather than a
(nearly) zero relation, when one attribute was much more impor-
tant than the other.
Two other results emerged from the same regression analysis.
First, the linear contrast between the levels of differential attribute
importance was significant, t(1173)  4.15, p  .00: Consistent
with existing evidence, conflict generally decreased with differen-
tial attribute importance. Second, the linear contrast between the
Table 1
Sample of the Stimulus Material Used in Experiment 1
Domain and attributesb
Dyadic choice sets {x, y}a
x ys yI xI xs y
Cellular phones










Laser (x) or inkjet (y) printer























Note. Complete listings of the stimulus material can be obtained from
Scholten and Sherman (2004).
a Small tradeoffs are implied by {x, ys} and {xs, y}. Intermediate tradeoffs
are implied by {x, yI} and {xI, y}. A large tradeoff is implied by {x, y}.
b Examples from the experimental conditions in which Attribute 1 was
about as important as Attribute 2 (cellular phones), Attribute 1 was more
important than Attribute 2 (laser or inkjet printer), and Attribute 1 was
much more important than Attribute 2 (cars), respectively.
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levels of tradeoff size was significant, t(1173)  2.60, p  .01:
Conflict generally increased with tradeoff size. Most theories of
decision making view this result as fundamental; the double-
mediation model views it as incidental to the decision situations
that are being considered.
Three regression results confirmed the specific shapes of the
relation between tradeoff size and conflict as well as their robust-
ness across decision tasks. First, when one attribute was about as
important as the other, the quadratic contrast between the levels of
tradeoff size was significant, t(391)  2.30, p  .02: Consistent
with H1.1, there was an inverse U-shaped relation between
tradeoff size and conflict. Including the interaction between qua-
dratic trend and decision task yielded an increase in goodness-of-
fit that was very small, .087 – .084  .002, and insignificant, F(8,
11)  0.78, p  .63. Thus, the inverse U-shaped relation was
robust across decision tasks.
Second, when one attribute was more important than the other,
the linear contrast between the levels of tradeoff size was signif-
icant, t(391)  3.76, p  .00: Consistent with H1.2, there was a
positive relation between tradeoff size and conflict. Including the
interaction between linear trend and decision task yielded an
increase in goodness-of-fit that was very small, .177 – .176 .002,
and insignificant, F(8, 11)  0.97, p  .50. Thus, the linear
relation was robust across decision tasks.
Third, when one attribute was much more important than the
other, the quadratic contrast between the levels of tradeoff size
approached significance, t(391)  1.89, p  .06: Inconsistent
with H1.3, there was a U-shaped relation between tradeoff size
and conflict. Including the interaction between quadratic trend
and decision task yielded an increase in goodness-of-fit that
was very small, .065 – .063  .002, and insignificant, F(8,
11)  0.71, p  .68. Thus, the U-shaped relation was robust
Figure 4. Display of each decision task on the computer screen, before (top panel) and after (bottom panel) the
selection of an option.
247DOUBLE-MEDIATION MODEL
across decision tasks. We return to this result in the
“Discussion.”
Conflict: Convergent and discriminant validity. As mentioned
earlier, the methodological differences between decision time and
the rating measures of conflict are useful for assessing the con-
struct validity of composite conflict measure Cˆ (see also Table 2).
Convergent validity may be evaluated in terms of the
monotrait– heteromethod correlation (see Campbell & Fiske,
1959) between decision time and a composite of the rating
measures (in principal component scores). This correlation was
moderately high, r  .42, and significant, t(1198)  16.14, p 
.00. To check whether there was any indication of an inverse
U-shaped relation between conflict and decision time, a possi-
bility raised by Berlyne (1962, 1966), we conducted a linear and
a polynomial (quadratic) regression analysis with decision time
as dependent variable and the composite of the rating measures
as independent variable. There was no inverse U-shaped rela-
tion but rather a positive, slightly accelerating one. The qua-
dratic model yielded an increase in goodness-of-fit that was
significant, F(1, 1197)  18.56, p  .00, but small, .19 – .18 
.01. Thus, nonlinearity posed no meaningful threat to the va-
lidity of decision time as a measure of conflict.
Discriminant validity may be evaluated in terms of the differ-
ence between, on the one hand, the monotrait–heteromethod cor-
relation between decision time and the composite of the rating
measures and, on the other hand, the heterotrait–monomethod
correlation between decision time and a composite of the rating
times (in principal component scores). This difference was posi-
tive, .42 – .35  .07, and significant, t(1197)  2.37, p  .02 (by
Hotelling’s t-statistic; see Lindeman et al., 1980, pp. 52–53).
Figure 5. Display of a rating task on the computer screen, before (top panel) and after (bottom panel) the
selection of a position along the rating scale.
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Conflict: Nomological validity. To the degree that our hypoth-
eses are supported, the composite measure of conflict is related to
tradeoff size and differential attribute importance in a theoretically
meaningful way, attesting to its nomological validity. We further
assess its nomological validity with respect to two behavioral
criteria: choice probability and choice equiprobability.
For choice equiprobability, there is a positive relation between
the degree to which the options are equally likely to be chosen and
manifestations of conflict, for example, decision time and lack of
confidence in the correctness of the decision reached (Festinger,
1943a, 1943b). This relation was already predicted by Cartwright
and Festinger’s (1943) quantitative theory of decision. For choice
probability, there is a negative relation between the likelihood with
which a particular option is chosen and manifestations of conflict,
for example, decision time (Jamieson & Petrusic, 1977; Petrusic &
Jamieson, 1978). Both relations are predicted by decision field
theory.
To examine these relations, we determined, for each unique
option pair in the design, the average level of conflict, the propor-
tions of participants choosing option x and option y, and the
average levels of conflict associated with each choice. There were
60 unique option pairs: In each of 12 decision domains, two pairs
implied a small tradeoff, two pairs implied an intermediate
tradeoff, and one pair implied a large tradeoff (see Figure 3). Two
option pairs were discarded, because option x was chosen by all
participants presented with those pairs. For each of the 58 remain-
ing option pairs, a measure of choice equiprobabiliy was obtained
by applying an entropy measure to the choice proportions: Letting
P be the proportion of participants who chose a particular option,
E(P)  [Plog2(P)  (1  P)log2(1  P)], where 0  P  1.
Both predicted relations emerged. First, across the 58 option
pairs, the correlation between E(P) and the average level of con-
flict was positive, r  .36, and significant, t(56)  2.87, p  .00,
confirming that choice equiprobability increases with conflict.
Second, across the 58 options pairs and the options within each
pair, the correlation between P and the average level of conflict
associated with a particular choice was negative, r  .42, and
significant, t(114)  4.89, p  .00, confirming that conflict
decreases with choice probability. Altogether, then, the composite
measure of conflict is related to choice probability and choice
equiprobability in a way that is consistent with existing theory and
evidence, further attesting to its nomological validity.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 confirm two of the three hypothe-
ses, as derived from the double-mediation model, about how
conflict is related to tradeoff size and how this relation is moder-
ated by differential attribute importance. There was an inverse
U-shaped relation between tradeoff size and conflict when one
attribute was about as important as the other and a positive relation
between tradeoff size and conflict when one attribute was more
important than the other. However, there was a U-shaped relation
between tradeoff size and conflict when one attribute was much
more important than the other, whereas it was hypothesized that
the relation between tradeoff size and conflict would (almost)
vanish in such a situation. This was actually the least controversial
hypothesis, which makes it all the more surprising that it was
disconfirmed.
The double-mediation model can technically accommodate this
U-shaped relation between tradeoff size and conflict if it assumes
conflict seeking, rather than conflict aversion, for situations of very
unequal attribute importance. However, such an assumption would
be implausible not only in relation to everything we know about
how people cope with conflict but also in relation to the result as
Figure 6. The observed relation between tradeoff size and conflict, as
moderated by differential attribute importance. Conflict is in principal
component scores, linearly transformed to a scale from 0 to 1.
Table 2
Experiment 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Conflict Measures and Rating
Times
Variable M SD log2(t) E(v) E(w) d u log2(tv) log2(tw) log2(td)
log2(t) 4.15 0.77
E(v) .81 .17 .30
E(w) .77 .19 .26 .59
d 4.21 1.94 .41 .55 .41
u 3.47 1.78 .39 .59 .44 .62
log2(tv) 2.96 0.75 .24 .19 .14 .18 .16
log2(tw) 3.09 0.75 .28 .14 .21 .17 .19 .43
log2(td) 2.58 0.69 .27 .14 .12 .14 .17 .45 .43
log2(tu) 2.49 0.71 .27 .18 .14 .16 .16 .41 .43 .47
Note. Computed across N  100 participants and k  12 decision tasks. All correlations significant at p
 .00005.
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such: Why would people seek conflict when it is “obvious” which
course of action to take?
We suspect that, as differential attribute importance increases to
high levels, and the preliminary conflict decreases to low levels,
deliberation is increasingly driven by perceptual aspects of the
decision task. The U-shaped relation between tradeoff size and
conflict suggests that, in situations of very unequal attribute im-
portance, choice is dictated by the preliminary impression unless
tradeoffs are conspicuously small, in which case people are
alarmed by the very weak arguments in favor of either decision, or
conspicuously large, in which case they are alarmed by the very
great sacrifices to be incurred in choosing one option instead of the
other. In the former case, conflict is mediated only by argumen-
tation whereas, in the latter case, it is mediated only by sacrifice.
Thus, in situations of very unequal attribute importance, conflict
generation is no longer a matter of “double mediation.” Instead,
conflict is mediated by the source that is activated by the percep-
tually salient tradeoff. This gives rise to the U-shaped relation
between tradeoff size and conflict: The greater the salience of a
tradeoff, the greater the conflict that is aroused by it.
The above interpretation is consistent with Borgida and
Howard-Pitney’s (1983) research on persuasion, which suggests
that a perceptually salient cue is more likely to persuade the
receivers of a message when those receivers are less likely to
cognitively elaborate on message content. In Borgida and Howard-
Pitney’s research, however, a perceptually salient cue favored one
of two attitudinal positions on an issue and, therefore, facilitated
the evaluation task. What is surprising about our result is that
perceptually salient tradeoffs complicated an otherwise simple
decision task: A tradeoff between two attributes of very unequal
importance strongly favored one of two options, so that it should
be “obvious” which option to choose, but it often was not. This
underscores Tversky and Simonson’s (1993) conclusion that peo-
ple often attend to “irrelevant” aspects of a situation and thus err
by “unnecessarily” complicating their task.
The double-mediation model generally predicts an inverse
U-shaped relation between tradeoff size and conflict which, under
the influence of other aspects of the decision situation, may change
in an upward or a downward direction. In Experiment 1, we
examined differential attribute importance, a situational aspect that
would change the inverse U-shaped relation in an upward direc-
tion. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to extend our analysis to an
aspect that would change the inverse U-shaped relation in a down-
ward direction.
Experiment 2
The double-mediation model introduces argumentation as a
mediator of the relation between tradeoff size and conflict: Argu-
mentation in the sense of justifying any decision to oneself. In
Experiment 2, we examine how the relation between tradeoff size
and conflict is moderated by the prospect of having to justify one’s
decision to others, more briefly referred to as need for
justification.10
The left panel of Figure 7A shows a situation where one at-
tribute is about as important as the other and there is no need for
justification. This is a replica of the situation shown in the left
panel of Figure 2A.
What are the implications of having to justify one’s decision to
others? We suggest that need for justification will shift attention
toward argumentation and away from sacrifice: People will be-
come more concerned with finding a strong argument for choosing
one option or the other but, in shifting their attention, they will
become less concerned with the sacrifice to be incurred in making
that choice. Thus, the double-mediation model predicts that need
for justification will increase the preliminary conflict generated by
concern about argumentation but decrease the preliminary conflict
generated by concern about sacrifice. Furthermore, the double-
mediation model predicts that the rise in preliminary conflict
generated by concern about argumentation will accentuate the
relation between tradeoff size and the conflict generated by that
concern, because it increases the associated drive for focused
deliberation. Finally, the double-mediation model predicts that the
fall in preliminary conflict generated by concern about sacrifice
will attenuate the relation between tradeoff size and the conflict
generated by that concern, because it decreases the associated
drive for focused deliberation.
The right panel of Figure 7A shows a situation in which one
attribute is about as important as the other and there is a need for
justification. The negative relation between tradeoff size and the
conflict generated by concern about argumentation has been ac-
centuated while the positive relation between tradeoff size and the
conflict generated by concern about sacrifice has been attenuated.
As a result, the relation between tradeoff size and final conflict has
changed in a downward direction.
In sum, we arrive at the following hypothesis about how the
relation between tradeoff size and conflict is moderated by need
for justification:
H2. Need for justification will change the relation between
tradeoff size and conflict in a downward direction.
As can be seen in Figure 7B, need for justification has no clear
overall effect on final conflict in this example: The final conflict
aroused by smaller tradeoffs is greater when there is a need for
justification, whereas the final conflict aroused by larger tradeoffs
is greater when there is no such need.
Evidence from research on accountability suggests that, when
people know the views that are held by the audience for their
justifications, they tend to simply conform to those views; but,
when they lack that knowledge, they tend to balance the pros and
cons of different views that may be held by the audience (Tetlock,
1983; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). The above analysis of
how need for justification moderates the relation between tradeoff
size and conflict assumes that people do not know the preferences
that are held by the audience of their justifications. To prevent our
participants from knowing or thinking that they know those pref-
erences, the identity of the audience was obscured (see “Partici-
pants and Procedure”) and thus situations eliciting strong or so-
cially desirable preferences were avoided.
For instance, the mileage of a car was much more important to
the participants in Experiment 1 than its acceleration. Even when
the audience and their preferences are unknown, the mere strength
10 Here, justifying one’s decision to others means explaining to others
why one chose one option instead of the other. Elsewhere, in the literature
on accountability, justifying one’s decision to others means not only
explaining the decision to others but also defending it against criticisms
from others (Tetlock, 1983). There is evidence suggesting that the effect of
expecting to explain one’s decision is similar to the effect of expecting to
explain and defend it (Simonson & Nye, 1992, Study 4).
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Figure 7. The double-mediation model. (A) The predicted relation between tradeoff size and conflict, as
moderated by need for justification in a situation of equal attribute importance. (B) Summary of the relations
between tradeoff size and final conflict.
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of preference for a car that is less costly in fuel consumption may
increase people’s tendency to overestimate the degree to which
their preference is shared by others (false consensus). In addition,
the social desirability of a preference for a car that is less wasteful
of energy may by itself increase people’s tendency to simply
conform to that preference. Thus, to prevent our participants from
second-guessing the preferences of the audience, situations elicit-
ing strong or socially desirable preferences were avoided.
Method
Design and stimuli. Each participant completed two sets of three
decision tasks in which, according to pretest results, one attribute was
about as important as the other. The tasks in one set were taken from
Experiment 1, but the attribute amounts were adjusted in accordance with
new pretest results on perceived tradeoff sizes; the tasks in the other set
were developed specifically for Experiment 2. The presentation order of
the two sets was counterbalanced across participants. The set presented
first was completed without justifications; the set presented last was
completed with justifications required.
For each set of decision tasks, each participant completed one task in
which the difference between the options along each attribute was per-
ceived to be small and insignificant (small tradeoff), one task in which the
difference between the options along each attribute was perceived to be
large and significant (large tradeoff), and one task in which the perceived
difference between the options along each attribute fell between these two
extremes (intermediate tradeoff). So that any particular decision task would
not always be associated with any particular tradeoff size, the association
of tradeoff sizes with decision tasks was counterbalanced across six groups
of participants.
Independently of tradeoff size, the option with respect to which tradeoffs
were small, intermediate, or large was manipulated between participants, in
that tradeoff size varied with respect to the option that was superior along
one attribute for one half of the participants and with respect to the option
that was superior along the other attribute for the other half (see Figure 3).
As in Experiment 1, this control variable had no reliable effects on conflict
and will not be discussed further.
As shown in Figure 3, the options composing the dyadic choice sets were
located along a straight line, either in linearly spaced attribute amounts or,
where pretest results revealed a greater sensitivity to differences near the
worst end of one attribute than to differences near the best end of the other,
in logarithmically spaced attribute amounts (up to slight deviations from
the straight line where attribute amounts were rounded). Table 3 provides
a sample of the stimulus material used in Experiment 2.
Participants and procedure. A total of 204 psychology students partic-
ipated in the experiment and were paid €7.50. Experimental sessions were run
by computer with at most 20 participants at a time. The procedure was the
same as in Experiment 1, except for the changes required by the manipulation
of need for justification. Specifically, the experiment consisted of a first part in
which decisions were made without justifications and a second part in which
decisions were made with justifications required. In the second part, the
participants typed in the justification for a decision after having completed the
decision task and accompanying rating tasks.
The participants were informed that the experiment consisted of two
parts and that, in each part, they would complete several decision tasks,
each accompanied by several rating tasks. They were given a description of
Table 3
Sample of the Stimulus Material Used in Experiment 2
Domain and attributesb
Dyadic choice sets {x, y}a
x yS yI xI xS y
Digital cameras
1 Digital zoom 2 X 4 X
2 X 8 X
2 X 16 X
8 X 16 X
12 X 16 X
















Note. Complete listings of the stimulus material can be obtained from Scholten and Sherman (2004).
a Small tradeoffs are implied by {x, yS} and {xS, y}. Intermediate tradeoffs are implied by {x, yI} and {xI, y}. A
large tradeoff is implied by {x, y}.
b As reported in the Results section, the attributes were of equal importance in only three decision tasks.
Against our intentions, the attributes were of unequal importance in the other three decision tasks. The table
contains an example from the situations in which Attribute 1 was about as important as Attribute 2 (digital
cameras) and an example from the situations in which Attribute 1 was more important than Attribute 2 (printers),
respectively.
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these tasks as well as instructions and rehearsal trials for keyboard han-
dling. Before the session began, they were asked to provide thoughtful and
truthful responses, relying on their personal tastes and judgments.
On concluding the first part, the participants learned that, in the second part,
they would have to justify their decisions, meaning that they would have to
explain why they had chosen one option instead of the other. They further
learned that the justifications given by the participants in the experiment would
be evaluated by an external committee and that a prize would be awarded to
the participant whose justifications received the best evaluation from the
committee. The participants were told that, if they turned out to be the winner,
they would receive either €50 in cash or €100 in vouchers for the college
bookshop and snack bar, whichever they preferred. They were asked to
indicate which prize they would prefer to receive if they turned out to be the
winner. The participants were further told that their responses would be treated
with full confidentiality, but that the winner of the prize would have to be
identified and notified. They were asked to type in their student number for this
purpose only. The participants were then reminded that justifying their deci-
sions meant explaining why they had chosen one option instead of the other,
but this time it was added that merely referring to one attribute as being more
important than the other would be classified as an incomplete justification by
the evaluating committee. They were further reminded, before the session
continued, to provide thoughtful and truthful responses, relying on their
personal tastes and judgments.
Results
Check on equal attribute importance. Although the decision
tasks were supposed to represent equal attribute importance, no
pair of attributes is exactly equal in importance (see Footnote 9).
As in Experiment 1, therefore, attribute 1 is designated as the more
important attribute while attribute 2 is designated as the less
important attribute.
A check on equal attribute importance was conducted by in-
specting the relative frequency with which participants chose
option x (the option that was superior along attribute 1) when there
was no need for justification. By the standards of Experiment 1,
the attributes were about equally important: The probability of
choosing option x did not differ between the equal-importance
condition of Experiment 1 (.59) and the no-justification condition
of Experiment 2 (.59), z  0.13, p  .90. However, in Experi-
ment 2, the probability of choosing option x was, against our
intentions, systematically lower in one set of decision tasks (.53)
than in the other (.65), z  2.86, p  .00.11 Thus, where
appropriate, we separate these two sets, comprising three decision
tasks each and representing situations of equal and unequal at-
tribute importance, respectively.
Test of hypothesis: Dependent variable. Table 4 provides the
means, standard deviations, and correlations for all measures taken
in Experiment 2. We conducted a principal component analysis on
the five conflict measures across the 204 participants and the 6
decision tasks. The first component had an eigenvalue of  2.79,
thus accounting for 55.73% of the total variance. No other eigen-
values exceeded the unit threshold. The reliability of the un-
weighted composite of standardized conflict measures was  
.80. To improve reliability, we constructed a weighted composite
measure of conflict, Cˆ , by deriving the (standardized) scores on the
first component and then linearly transforming these scores to a
scale from 0 to 1.
Test of hypothesis: Independent variables. The hypothesis that
need for justification would change the relation between tradeoff
size and conflict in a downward direction was tested with a linear
regression analysis, run across participants and decision tasks. The
analysis included 1 contrast between the 2 levels of need for
justification, 1 contrast between the 2 levels of differential attribute
importance, 4 orthogonal difference contrasts between the 3 rep-
lications of the respective levels of differential attribute impor-
tance (capturing the overall differences in conflict between repli-
cations), 2 orthogonal polynomial contrasts (linear and quadratic)
between the 3 levels of tradeoff size, 1 contrast between the 2
levels of the control variable (the option with respect to which
tradeoff size was varied), and 18 orthogonal contrasts capturing the
interactions between the independent variables (need for justifica-
tion, differential attribute importance, tradeoff size, and the control
variable). On the basis of H2, we expected that need for justifica-
tion would interact with the linear trend in the relation between
tradeoff size and conflict. More specifically, we expected that this
interaction would have a negative coefficient.
To check whether the predicted interaction was robust across
decision tasks, the regression analysis also included 4 contrasts
capturing the variability of the interaction across the 3 replications
of the respective levels of differential attribute importance which,
in combination with the contrast capturing the variability of the
interaction across the 2 levels of differential attribute importance
(1 of the 18 interaction terms mentioned earlier), indicate the lack
of robustness of the interaction across decision tasks. We evaluated
11 A Newman–Keuls test had revealed significant differences in the
probability of choosing option x between decision tasks from different sets
but not among the decision tasks from the same set.
Table 4
Experiment 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Conflict Measures and Rating
Times
Variable M SD log2(t) E(v) E(w) d u log2(tv) log2(tw) log2(td)
log2(t) 4.49 0.86
E(v) .83 .16 .30
E(w) .79 .17 .28 .62
d 4.19 1.97 .39 .59 .44
u 3.44 1.79 .30 .53 .39 .55
log2(tv) 3.09 0.76 .22 .13 .09 .13 .10
log2(tw) 3.23 0.76 .32 .13 .14 .11 .06 .34
log2(td) 2.67 0.71 .21 .12 .11 .09 .06 .42 .41
log2(tu) 2.65 0.75 .18 .12 .10 .07 .07 .39 .35 .42
Note. Computed across N  204 participants and k  6 decision tasks. All correlations significant at p  .05.
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whether exclusion of these 5 contrasts, capturing the interaction
among need for justification, linear trend, and decision task,
yielded a reliable and meaningful decrease in goodness-of-fit (R2)
of the regression model.
Test of hypothesis: Results. Figure 8 shows how the relation
between tradeoff size and conflict is moderated by need for justi-
fication and differential attribute importance. Need for justification
interacted significantly with the linear contrast between the levels
of tradeoff size, t(1192)  3.11, p  .00: Consistent with H2,
need for justification changed the relation between tradeoff size
and conflict in a downward direction. More specifically, a positive
relation changed into an inverse U-shaped relation (see top panel
of Figure 8). Excluding the interaction between need for justifica-
tion, linear trend, and decision task yielded a decrease in goodness-
of-fit that was very small, .145 – .150  .005, and insignificant,
F(26, 31)  1.53, p  .13. Thus, the predicted effect was robust
across decision tasks.
Three other results emerged, all consistent with the evidence from
Experiment 1. First, the contrast between the levels of differential
attribute importance was significant, t(1192)  –9.85, p  .00:
Conflict decreased with differential attribute importance. Second, the
linear contrast between the levels of tradeoff size was significant,
t(1192)  2.15, p  .03: Conflict generally increased with tradeoff
size. Third, differential attribute importance interacted significantly
with the linear contrast between the levels of tradeoff size, t(1192) 
1.94, p  .05: Differential attribute importance changed the relation
between tradeoff size and conflict in an upward direction. More
specifically, an inverse U-shaped relation changed into a positive
relation (see bottom panel of Figure 8).
Conflict: Convergent and discriminant validity. Convergent
validity was assessed in terms of the correlation between decision
time and a composite of the rating measures of conflict (in prin-
cipal component scores), which was moderately high, r  .40, and
significant, t(1222)  15.05, p  .00. There was no inverse
U-shaped relation between conflict and decision time but rather a
positive, slightly accelerating one. We conducted a linear and a
polynomial (quadratic) regression analysis with decision time as
dependent variable and the composite of the rating measures as
independent variable. The quadratic model yielded an increase in
goodness-of-fit that was significant, F(1, 1221)  12.43, p  .00,
but small, .17 – .16  .01. Discriminant validity was assessed in
terms of the difference between, on the one hand, the correlation
between decision time and the composite of the rating measures
and, on the other hand, the correlation between decision time and
a composite of the rating times (in principal component scores).
This difference was positive, .40 – .31  .08, and significant,
t(1221)  2.50, p  .01 (by Hotelling’s t-statistic).
Conflict: Nomological validity. We assessed whether the com-
posite conflict measure was negatively related to choice probability
and positively related to choice equiprobability. Thus, we determined,
for each unique option pair in the design, the average level of conflict,
the proportions of participants choosing option x and option y, and the
average levels of conflict associated with each choice. There were 30
unique option pairs: In each of 6 decision domains, 2 pairs implied a
small tradeoff, 2 pairs implied an intermediate tradeoff, and 1 pair
implied a large tradeoff (see Figure 3). For each option pair, a measure
of choice equiprobabiliy was obtained by applying an entropy mea-
sure, EP, to the choice proportions, P.
Across the 30 option pairs, the correlation between EP and the
average level of conflict was positive, r  .52, and significant,
t(28)  3.19, p  .00, confirming that choice equiprobability
increases with conflict. However, across the 30 options pairs and
the options within each pair, the correlation between P and the
average level of conflict associated with a particular choice was
negative, r  .18, and approached significance, t(58)  1.37,
p .09, confirming that conflict decreases with choice probability.
Justifications: Protocol analysis. The protocols were analyzed
by three independent judges. The contents of the justifications
were covered by six categories: (a) conflict; (b) the relative im-
portance of the attributes; (c) the size of the tradeoff between the
attributes; (d) desire or need for the product; (e) familiarity with
the product; and (f) financial, physical, psychic, or temporal con-
straints on the acquisition or utilization of the product. The com-
posite interjudge reliability coefficient was .84. Disagreements
were resolved by discussion. The proportions of references to the
categories were .06, .54, .16, .14, .13, and .05, respectively. Thus,
the majority of references were made to the relative importance of
the attributes. The correlations between references to the catego-
ries hovered around zero, except for those between references to
relative attribute importance and references to the other categories,
which were significantly below zero (r  .30, averaged across
Figure 8. The observed relation between tradeoff size and conflict, as
moderated by need for justification (top panel) and differential attribute
importance (bottom panel). Conflict is in principal component scores,
linearly transformed to a scale from 0 to 1.
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categories). Thus, references to relative attribute importance
tended to inhibit references to all other categories.
For each category of substantive interest (conflict, the relative
importance of the attributes, and the size of the tradeoff between
the attributes), we ran a nonlinear regression analysis (LOGIT)
across participants and decision tasks. The dependent variable was
reference to the category. The independent variables were those
included in the linear regression analysis testing H2, this time also
including conflict but excluding need for justification and its
interactions with the other variables.
Conflict stimulated references to conflict, 	2(1)  69.78, p 
.00, which further attests to the convergent validity of the com-
posite conflict measure, and inhibited references to two principal
causes of conflict: (a) the relative importance of the attributes,
	2(1)  5.31, p  .02, and (b) the size of the tradeoff between the
attributes, 	2(1)  3.81, p  .05. Tradeoff size had two effects on
references to tradeoff size. First, small or large tradeoffs stimulated
more such references than tradeoffs of intermediate size, .17 –
.08  .09, 	2(1)  9.06, p  .00. Second, small tradeoffs stimu-
lated more such references than large tradeoffs, .21 – .13  .09,
	2(1)  5.39, p  .02. The former result suggests that people are
alerted by conspicuously small or large tradeoffs even when per-
ceptual salience of tradeoffs has no apparent consequences for
conflict generation (see the “Discussion” of Experiment 1). The
latter result suggests that, when there is a need for justification,
people are alerted more by small tradeoffs than by large ones,
which is entirely consistent with the theoretical analysis in the
introduction to this experiment.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 confirm the hypothesis, as derived
from the double-mediation model, that need for justification
changes the relation between tradeoff size and conflict in a down-
ward direction. Although our intention was to test this hypothesis
in a situation of equal attribute importance, only half of the
decision tasks represented such a situation. The other half repre-
sented a situation of unequal attribute importance. Accordingly,
tradeoff size had a positive relation with conflict, which became an
inverse U-shaped relation when there was a need for justification
(top panel of Figure 8), in contrast with our earlier example, in
which tradeoff size had an inverse U-shaped relation with conflict,
which became a negative relation when there was a need for
justification (Figure 7B). However, the double-mediation model
can accurately account for the results of our experiment.
Figure 9A shows how need for justification moderates the relation
between tradeoff size and conflict in a situation of unequal attribute
importance. In comparison to Figure 7A, the relations between
tradeoff size and the conflict generated by concern about sacrifice and
concern about argumentation are attenuated, because of an overall
decline in preliminary conflict levels and associated drives for focused
deliberation. Specifically, the situation in which is no need for justi-
fication, shown in the left panel of Figure 9A, is similar to the
situation shown in the center panel of Figure 2A: The negative
relation between tradeoff size and the conflict generated by concern
about argumentation is attenuated to a greater degree than the positive
relation between tradeoff size and the conflict generated by concern
about sacrifice, giving rise to a positive relation between tradeoff size
and final conflict. The right panel of Figure 9A shows a situation in
which there is a need for justification. In comparison to the left panel,
the relation between tradeoff size and the conflict generated by con-
cern about argumentation is accentuated but the relation between
tradeoff size and the conflict generated by sacrifice is attenuated, as
theorized, changing the positive relation between tradeoff size and
final conflict into an inverse U-shaped relation (see also the summary
in Figure 9B).
Given that the attributes were of equal importance in half of the
decision tasks but of unequal importance in the other half, we had an
additional opportunity to test the principal hypothesis of Experiment
1, according to which a change from equal to unequal attribute
importance will change the relation between tradeoff size and conflict
in an upward direction, more specifically, change an inverseU-shaped
relation into a (more) positive relation. The results of Experiment 2
also confirm this hypothesis (bottom panel of Figure 8).
The intended effect of the need-for-justification manipulation
was that our participants would shift their attention toward argu-
mentation and away from sacrifice. For reasons given in the
introduction to this experiment, the audience of their justifications
had to remain unknown. To ensure that the audience would none-
theless be relevant to them (why else bother justifying their deci-
sions to others?), a prize was awarded to the participant whose
justifications were received most favorably by the audience. Thus,
the prize was integral to the purpose of the manipulation. For those
interested in the effects of need for justification per se, the prize
may be a confounding factor, although we do not see how a prize
per se (or, indeed, typing the justification per se) could have
produced our results.
In our experimental design, the set of decision tasks presented
first was completed without justifications, and the set presented
last was completed with justifications. It would have been inap-
propriate to counterbalance the order of the need-for-justification
conditions, because participants going through the reverse order
would probably adopt a justification frame of mind when asked to
justify their decisions but not abandon that frame of mind when no
longer asked for justifications. Moreover, in our experimental
design, any order effect probably countervails the moderating
effect of need for justification, because experience with earlier
decision tasks, particularly those in which attributes are of unequal
importance, may be applied to later ones, so that, according to the
double-mediation model, the relation between tradeoff size and
conflict should become more positive. The order effect can actu-
ally be tested within the experimental conditions (need for justi-
fication and no such need). We therefore ran an additional regres-
sion analysis that included, among the independent variables, the
ordinal position of a decision task (randomized across participants)
and its interactions with the other variables.12 As expected, the
relation between tradeoff size and conflict was more positive when
a decision task appeared later than when it appeared earlier, t(1,
1184)  2.42, p  .02, and this order effect was specific to
decision tasks in which the attributes were of unequal importance,
t(1, 1184)  2.22, p  .03. Thus, if the ordinal position of those
decision tasks had an analogous effect between the experimental
conditions, our hypothesis about the moderating effect of need for
justification was confirmed despite a countervailing order effect.
12 We excluded the control variable indicating the option with respect to
which tradeoff size varied and its interactions with the other variables,
which all had negligible effects in the original analysis.
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Figure 9. The double-mediation model. (A) The predicted relation between tradeoff size and conflict, as
moderated by need for justification in a situation of unequal attribute importance. (B) Summary of the relations
between tradeoff size and final conflict.
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General Discussion
Real choices involve tradeoffs and tradeoffs induce conflict. The
double-mediation model describes how tradeoffs induce conflict
and, on this basis, how conflict is related to the size of tradeoffs.
Our model suggests that this relation can take on many forms and
that the specific shape depends on the decision situation.
The double-mediation model introduces three ingredients to the
explanation of decisional conflict: First, the existence of two
sources of conflict in preference formation (concern about sacri-
fice and concern about argumentation); second, the prevalence of
the source from which the least conflict is elicited (conflict aver-
sion); and third, the capacity of the preliminary conflict elicited
from either source as a drive for focused deliberation (orientation
reaction). The first two ingredients give rise to an inverse
U-shaped relation between tradeoff size and final conflict. The
third ingredient gives rise to situational dependence, in that the
decision situation may change the inverse U-shaped relation into a
(more) positive or (more) negative relation.
Our experimental results generally support the predictions of the
double-mediation model, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
However, future investigation may extend the analysis to decision
domains other than consumer choice. Obvious candidates would
be risky choice and intertemporal choice, both prominent objects
of study in the field of behavioral decision making. The analysis
may further be extended to other aspects of the decision situation.
For instance, consumer products may be differentiated by discrete
features rather than continuous attributes (e.g., Dhar & Sherman,
1996), the choice options may be presented sequentially rather
than simultaneously (e.g., Dhar, 1996), and the choice set may
include a no-choice option (free choice) rather than exclude it
(forced choice; e.g., Dhar & Simonson, 2003).
As we described in the beginning of this article, the idea of a
double-mediation model originated from the contradiction between
what most theories of decision making suggest about how conflict is
related to tradeoff size and what many people believe about this
relation. On detecting this contradiction, we asked ourselves, “Which
view is correct?” Because either one seemed intuitively plausible to
us, our answer was, “Both.” Subsequent thinking about the implica-
tions of a double-mediation process for the relation between tradeoff
size and final conflict was greatly inspired by McGuire’s (1968)
information-processing model of persuasion. Because the
information-processing model played a vital role in the evolution of
the double-mediation model, we discuss below the commonalities and
differences between these two formulations.
Comparison With the Information-Processing Model of
Persuasion
The double-mediation model, in which the conflict aroused by a
tradeoff is mediated by sacrifice and argumentation, and a rudi-
mentary version of the information-processing model, in which
persuasion by a message is mediated by reception and yielding,
can be summarized in exactly the same way: (a) The relation
between an independent variable and a dependent variable is
mediated by two factors; the mediating effect of one factor is
positive, whereas the mediating effect of the other factor is nega-
tive; an interaction of the opposite effects gives rise to an inverse
U-shaped relation between the independent variable and the de-
pendent variable; and third variables may change the relative
magnitude of the mediating effects, thus changing the inverse
U-shaped relation into a (more) positive or (more) negative rela-
tion. Despite these similarities, however, the models are very
different, both conceptually and mathematically. Below, we dis-
cuss three conceptual differences.
Justification for opposite effects. McGuire’s (1968) two-factor
model assumes that an independent variable tends to affect recep-
tion and yielding in opposite directions. However, the justification
for assuming opposite effects is not very convincing: As adapted to
the two-factor model, “people and the world are so structured that
quite frequently a variable which affects one [factor] positively
tends to affect [the other factor] negatively” (McGuire, 1978, p.
170). Actually, assuming, rather than simply allowing for, opposite
effects seems to expose the information-processing model to need-
less risk of disconfirmation (Scholten, 1996): The assumption may
hold in some situations (e.g., receiver intelligence helps reception
but hurts yielding; see McGuire, 1968, 1969) but not in others
(e.g., source credibility helps yielding but does not affect recep-
tion; see McGuire, 1969). The double-mediation model also as-
sumes that an independent variable affects one mediating factor in
a positive direction and another mediating factor in a negative
direction. However, it provides a simple and compelling justifica-
tion for assuming opposite effects: Larger tradeoffs mean greater
sacrifices, thus leading to a greater conflict, but also stronger
arguments, thus leading to less conflict.
Justification for interacting effects. In the information-
processing model, reception and yielding are two successive stages
of the persuasion process. The interaction of their mediating ef-
fects has a logical justification: It is not possible to reach the
yielding stage without having reached the reception stage first. In
the double-mediation model, concern about sacrifice and concern
about argumentation are two sources of conflict that operate si-
multaneously in the process of preference formation. The interac-
tion of their mediating effects has a psychological justification:
Conflict is an unpleasant state with which people tend to cope
along the route of least resistance, so that given two levels of
conflict from two sources, the lower level of conflict, whatever its
source, will contribute more to final conflict.
Attenuation of mediating effects. In the information-
processing model, the mediating effect of either stage of the
persuasion process (reception or yielding) may be attenuated in a
downward direction, when a third variable makes it less likely that
the stage will be reached, or in an upward direction, when a third
variable makes it more likely that the stage will be reached. In
general, the mediating effect of either stage of the persuasion
process increases as the prior uncertainty of reaching that stage
increases. In the double-mediation model, any attenuation of the
mediating effect of either source of conflict (concern about sacri-
fice or concern about argumentation) is always in a downward
direction, because the mediating effect is attenuated only when a
third variable decreases the preliminary conflict elicited from that
source and, thus, the drive for focused deliberation. In general, the
mediating effect of either source of conflict increases as the
preliminary conflict elicited from that source increases.
In sum, there are three conceptual differences between the
double-mediation model of conflict generation and a model that
greatly inspired its evolution, the information-processing model of
persuasion. These three differences correspond to the three ingre-
dients that the double-mediation model has introduced to the
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explanation of decisional conflict: Double mediation, conflict
aversion, and orientation reaction.
Inverse U-shaped relations abound in psychology, and they can
be found in behavioral decision making as well. It is perhaps useful
to compare the double-mediation model with Coombs’ (1987;
Coombs & Avrunin, 1977) theory of single-peaked preference
functions, because of its allusion to “the structure of conflict.”
Comparison With the Theory of Single-Peaked Preference
Functions
The double-mediation model generally predicts an inverse
U-shaped relation between tradeoff size and conflict. We tested
this prediction in situations where, as shown in Figure 3, a large
tradeoff was implied by two extreme options while intermediate
and small tradeoffs were implied by either extreme option and less
extreme options. Coombs (1987; Coombs & Avrunin, 1977) has
specified four conditions that give rise to a single-peaked prefer-
ence function in such situations, meaning that, as we move from
one extreme end of the option set to the other, preference for the
options first increases and then decreases. Below, we discuss this
formulation, showing why, given the stimulus design in Figure 3,
an inverse U-shaped relation between tradeoff size and conflict is
incompatible with a single-peaked preference function.
A primary condition for single-peaked preference functions is
that the preference be either increasing in attribute amounts (“more
is better”) or decreasing in attribute amounts (“less is better”).
Three kinds of tradeoffs may be distinguished, all of which were
included in the stimulus material for our experiments: Approach–
approach conflicts, when more is better along both attributes, for
example, jobs implying a tradeoff between contract duration and
monthly wage, avoidance–avoidance conflicts, when less is better
along both attributes, for example, a laser printer and a inkjet
printer implying a tradeoff between cost per print and price, and
approach–avoidance conflicts, when more is better along one
attribute but less is better along the other, for example, cellular
phones implying a tradeoff between talk time and weight.
Coombs specifies three more conditions for these kinds of tradeoffs
so as to arrive at single-peaked preference functions, one addressing
the valuation of attribute amounts (how attribute amounts are trans-
formed into attribute values), another addressing the valuation of
options (how attribute values are integrated into an overall value), and
still another addressing the pattern of tradeoff rates implied by adja-
cent options (how the rates of exchange between attributes 1 and 2
evolve when moving from one extreme of the option set to the other).
The details of these conditions are not important here.
What is important, however, is that, given the stimulus design in
Figure 3, an inverse U-shaped relation between tradeoff size and
conflict is incompatible with a single-peaked preference function:
The large tradeoff (between the two extreme options) and the small
tradeoffs (between either one of the extreme options and the
adjacent option) should have resulted in the smallest differences in
overall value between the options and, thus, in the highest levels of
conflict, while the intermediate tradeoffs should have resulted in
the greatest differences in overall value between the options and,
thus, in the lowest levels of conflict. In other words, there should
have been a U-shaped relation between tradeoff size and conflict,
the reverse of what we predicted and observed.
Although several conditions specified by Coombs may have been
violated, we believe that the independent valuation of options is an
inaccurate description of preference formation in the decision situa-
tions being considered (viz., simultaneous presentation of two options
implying a tradeoff between two attributes). The double-mediation
model suggests that, in such situations, preference formation involves
direct comparisons between the attribute amounts delivered by the
options, rather than comparisons between overall values of the options
deriving from those attribute amounts. This different perspective on
preference formation has different implications for conflict
generation.
Conclusion
We have developed the double-mediation model as an autono-
mous model of conflict generation, drawing on the assumptions
about preference formation from decision field theory. As men-
tioned earlier, decision field theory can be viewed as a theory of
decision making, by predicting the probability that a particular
decision will be made, and a theory of the conflict involved in
decision making, by predicting the average time it will take to
make that decision. Future investigation may determine whether
and how decision field theory can accommodate the processes of
conflict generation described by the double-mediation model. If it
can, it would improve our understanding of choice and conflict.
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In this appendix, we provide a fully parametric formulation of the
double-mediation model, estimate its parameters from our experimental
results, and perform parametric tests of our hypotheses.
Parametric Formulation of the Double-Mediation Model
Final conflict, C, is a function of conflict generated by concern about
sacrifice, S, and conflict generated by concern about argumentation, A.
Applying Anderson’s (1971) integration theory,
C  1  wS wA, (A1)
where 0  w  1 and, without loss of generality, conflict is expressed on
a scale from 0 to 1. In this formulation, 1  w is the relative weight of S,
and w is the relative weight of A. The relative weight w can be written as













Given conflict aversion, the relative contribution of S and A to C is a
function of their relative levels. Thus, S and A are to be defined as a








  0 and   0. In this formulation, 
 is an arbitrary scaling
constant. For instance, if conflict were expressed on a scale from 0 to 10
instead of a scale from 0 to 1, 
 would be 10 times smaller. In addition, 
is a conflict-aversion parameter. The greater , the greater the aversion to
conflict. Substituting Equations A4 and A5 into Equation A3,
C 
A
S  A S
S
S  A A. (A6)
Thus, 
 drops out and C can be written as a function of S, A, and  only.
If   0, representing an absence of conflict aversion, C is the arithmetic
average of S and A:
C 
A0
S0  A0 S
S0
S0  A0 A
1⁄2S 1⁄2A 1⁄2S A. (A7)
To illustrate this integration rule, S.5 and A  .5 yield C  .5, and so do
S  .1 and A  .9. Thus, S and A contribute equally to C. Alternatively, if
  1⁄2, representing a specific degree of conflict aversion, C is the geo-
metric average of S and A:
C 
A1/ 2
S1/ 2  A1/ 2 S
S1/ 2
S1/ 2  A1/ 2 A
 S1/ 2A1/ 2
S1/ 2  A1/ 2
S1/ 2  A1/ 2  S
1/ 2A1/ 2  SA1/ 2. (A8)
To illustrate this integration rule, S  .5 and A  .5 yield C  .5, but S 
.1 and A  .9 yield C  .3. Thus, S, the lower level of conflict, contributes
more to C. More generally, if we compare Equations A7 and A8, we can
verify that (SA)1/2  1⁄2(S  A) if and only if S  A and that (SA)1/2 
1⁄2(S  A) otherwise, as required by conflict aversion.
The conflict generated by each concern is a function of conflict from a
preliminary impression, updated by conflict from subsequent deliberation.
Again applying Anderson’s (1971) integration theory,
S  1  wSS0  wS S1, (A9)
A  1  wAA0  wAA1. (A10)
where 0  wS, wA  1. The updating parameters, wS and wA, are relative









where S, A  0. The preliminary conflict generated by each concern, S0
and A0, is a drive for focused deliberation. Therefore, S and A are to be






where   0. In this formulation, 
 is the same arbitrary scaling constant
as in Equations A4 and A5. In addition,  is a drive-capacity parameter.
The greater , the greater the drive capacity of the preliminary conflict.
Finally, the conflict generated by concern about sacrifice and concern
about argumentation during deliberation is related in opposite directions to
tradeoff size, T. Thus, S1 and A1 are to be defined as functions of T. Using
linear functions for this purpose,
S1  T, (A15)
A1  (1 T ), (A16)
where   0 and, without loss of generality, tradeoff size is expressed on
a scale from 0 to 1. In this formulation,  is an arbitrary constant scaling
tradeoff size with respect to conflict. If, as in the present analysis, tradeoff
size is expressed on the same scale as conflict,   1.
Estimation of Parameters
We estimate the model from the experimental results displayed in
Figure 6 (two of the three conditions: equal and unequal attribute impor-
tance) and those displayed in the top panel of Figure 8 (both conditions:
need and no need for justification). Each condition provides three data
points, corresponding to the three tradeoff sizes (small, intermediate, and
large). Thus, we arrive at a total of 12 data points.
The model requires estimation of 11 parameters, viz., S0 and A0 (the
conflict from the preliminary impression) for all four conditions, 
 (the
arbitrary scaling constant),  (the drive-capacity parameter), and  (the
conflict-aversion parameter). To save one degree of freedom, we estimate
the model under the assumption that   1⁄2, so that final conflict is given
by Equation A8 rather than Equation A6. Testing a new model with only
two degrees of freedom is not unprecedented (e.g., Tversky, 1972) nor
uninformative (e.g., testing a linear model on three data points forming an
isosceles triangle has only one degree of freedom but yields a zero fit).
Equations A13 and A14 were substituted into Equations A11 and A12,
respectively, which were substituted into Equations A9 and A10, respec-
tively, which were substituted into Equation A8 to predict final conflict.
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We ran a nonlinear regression, minimizing the sum of squared deviations
between observed and predicted conflict, with the use of the Simplex and
Quasi-Newton estimation algorithm (StatSoft, 2003). Given the linear
functions in Equations A15 and A16, we set S1 to 1/6, 3/6, and 5/6, and set
A1 to 5/6, 3/6, and 1/6, for small, intermediate, and large tradeoffs,
respectively. These specific settings affect the estimates of 
 and  but not
the estimates of S0 and A0, which are of prime substantive interest.
The fit of the model was nearly perfect, in that 100% 	 R2  99.92%
of the variance in observed conflict was accounted for by the variance in
predicted conflict. The estimates of 
 and  (standard errors in parenthe-
ses) were 
ˆ  1.85 (0.01) and 
ˆ  8.14 (0.67). Figure A1 displays the
estimated relation between the preliminary conflict, denoted K0, and the







The points in Figure A1 refer to the estimates of the preliminary conflict
generated by each concern, Sˆ0 and Aˆ 0, in each of the four experimental
conditions. These estimates, and their standard errors, are provided in
Table A1.
Parametric Tests of Hypotheses
The reasoning underlying H1.2 was that, in comparison to a situation of
equal attribute importance, a situation of unequal attribute importance
would lead to a decrease in S0 as well as a decrease in A0 but that the
decrease in A0 would be greater than the decrease in S0. The estimates
confirm this pattern. The decrease in Sˆ0 was significant, .518 – .590 
.072, t(2) –8.94, p .01, and so was the decrease in Aˆ 0, .421 – .575
.154, t(2)  –14.93, p  .00. Moreover, the decrease in Aˆ 0 was signif-
icantly greater than the decrease in Sˆ0, –.154 – (–.072)  –.082, t(2) 
–16.92, p  .00.
The reasoning underlying H2 was that, in comparison to a situation
without a need for justification, a situation with a need for justification
would lead to a decrease in S0 but an increase in A0. The estimates confirm
this pattern. The decrease in Sˆ0 was significant, .474 – .509 –.035, t(2)
–9.18, p  .01, and so was the increase in Aˆ 0, .486 – .440  .046, t(2) 
13.16, p  .00.
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Table A1








1 No Equal .590 .575
(.009) (.008)
1 No Unequal .518 .421
(.003) (.002)
2 No Unequal .509 .440
(.003) (.002)
2 Yes Unequal .474 .486
(.002) (.002)
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Figure A1. The estimated relation between the preliminary conflict, K0,
and the updating parameter, wK. Filled circles denote equal attribute
importance and no need for justification. Filled squared denote unequal
attribute importance and no need for justification. Unfilled squared denote
unequal attribute importance and need for justification.
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